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Abstract 
In this paper, I seek to determine whether the robust gender difference 
in preferences for trade protection shown in surveys of individuals extends 
to legislators' votes in the U.S. House of Representatives. Since this phe­
nomenon would equate with a voting pattern other than that which most 
benefits their constituents and their party, it could show that demographic 
characteristics of legislators can cause them to "shirk" the interests of 
their constituents and their party. I examine a large 20-year sample of 
House votes on trade policy combined with a dataset of congressional dis­
trict characteristics and legislator gender. I find that protectionist voting 
is not significantly correlated with legislator gender when controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity between districts. 
Acknowledgements: This paper has benefited from the advice and assistance of my thesis 
advisor, Bruce Blonigen. Any errors or omissions are completely my own. 
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1 Introduction 
A recent literature finds a significant effect of gender on trade policy pref­
erences among the general public. Specifically, females have a much greater 
propensity to indicate a preference for trade protection in surveys of individuals' 
preferences over trade policy choices. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O'Rourke 
and Sinnott (2001) find robust gender effects in a cross-national survey. Bur­
goon and Hiscox (2004) once again find a robust infuence of gender in a U.S. 
survey, particularly among the college-educated. However, this literature is 
only indicative of a gender difference in preferences among citizens, not among 
legislators. 
On the contrary, the question of whether this gender difference persists in 
Congress has gone largely uninvestigated. Should persistence be found, it would 
show that male and female legislators in the same situation would have signif­
icantly different probabilities of voting for protectionist policy. It is assumed 
that constituents do not change their preferences for trade policy simply be­
cause they happen to have a male legislator instead of a female one, and that 
political party leadership would like all of that party's members to vote in the 
same manner. Therefore, this would imply that legislators are imperfect agents 
of their constituents as well as the party to which they belong, at least when it 
comes to protectionism. 
The issue of a principal-agent problem in legislative voting has been a topic 
of discussion in the political economy field for some time. Kalt and Zupan 
(1984) provide one of the canonical analyses of shirking behavior by looking 
at the influence of legislator ideology on voting through the use of the vote 
index of a watchdog organization. Kau and Rubin (1979) use several indices 
and several bills to analyze this ideologically-based shirking behavior. This ap­
proach is criticized by Peltzman (1982), who points out that the roles of ideology 
and constituent characteristics are difficult to disentangle, and by Coates and 
Munger (1995), who seek to determine evidence of shirking by looking at the 
effect of electoral security on the influence of constituency characteristics on 
legislators. They also examine whether some legislator characteristics influence 
voting behavior, but give no rationale for the characteristics they choose. In 
addition, their samples are limited to one bill in their first regression, and an 
index of votes in a single congress in their second. Finally, a thorough review 
of the literature on this subject is provided by Bender and Lott (1996). I seek 
to expand upon these findings as to shirking on the one hand and expand upon 
the literature linking gender to trade policy preference on the other. 
Coates and Munger provide a framework for analyzing legislative voting be­
havior based on the concept of an indirect utility function using legislator char­
acteristics, constituency characteristics, institutional pressures, and electoral 
security as arguments. This model allows me to test whether gender has an 
effect on voting behavior independent of constituency characteristics though an 
impact on legislator preferences over outcomes. I adapt it to a linear probability 
model of a legislator demand function and use a dataset containing individual 
U.S. House of Representatives trade policy votes merged with data on the con­
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stituency characteristics of each congressperson. I find that, ceteris paribus, 
female legislators do not necessarily have a higher utility-maximizing probabil­
ity of voting in favor of protectionist policy than do male ones; instead, it is 
likely that some unobserved heterogeneity causes districts that favor more trade 
protection to also elect female representatives more often. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section, I present my version 
of Burgoon and Hiscox's model, and my hypothesis about the legislator gender 
effect. Next, I discuss the data used, and how the votes used were selected. In 
section four, I present my empirical results and briefly discuss their significance. 
Finally, I offer a conclusion. 
Model 
I use a version of the model formulated by Coates and Munger. Suppose, in a 
game based on repeated voting, that a legislator's utility function is of the form 
U(g, x) where g is a vector of consumption goods, including trade policy, other 
policy, and reelection outcomes, and x is a vector of preference-determining 
characteristics. But maximizing this utility is subject to a reelection constraint 
which can be written as an implicit function as follows: 
F(c,p,s) = 0	 (1) 
where c, p, s are vectors of constituent interest, party and institutional pressure, 
and electoral security variables, respectively. 
Then, since for any vote i, a legislator has a binary choice between trade 
policies, the utility-maximizing probability of voting for a policy such as free 
trade is a function of the constraint and legislator preferences, Le. a demand 
function 
k : c, p, s, x -+ [0, 1] 
This demand function can be modeled as a function of an approximation to the 
constraint F and characteristics x, as Coates and Munger do with their indirect 
utility function. Thus I estimate 
FREETRADEVOTEij = aj +c~j'P+P~j7f+s~j8+x~j,B+C~jrSij+X~jE>Sij+Eij 
where, in specifications with bill fixed effects, FREETRADEVOTEij denotes 
vote i on bill j and, in specifications with congressional district fixed effects, 
FREETRADEVOTEij denotes vote i by the representative of district j . 
•	 For c, I use the demographic controls listed in section 3. In congressional 
district fixed effects specifications, the aj fixed effects control for unob­
served district-specific heterogeneity instead. 
•	 For p, I use a party variable for party pressures. In bill fixed effects 
specifications, the aj fixed effects control for institutional pressures and 
other unobserved bill-specific heterogeneity. 
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•	 For s, I use years of incumbency to proxy for electoral security. 
• For	 x, I use legislator gender, the variable of interest. Note that, as 
Coates and Munger do, I use an interaction term between incumbency and 
demographic controls to capture any reduction in the effect of constituent 
effects brought about by the increased electoral security that comes with 
incumbency. Additionally, I use an interaction term between incumbency 
and gender to capture any difference in gender effects brought about by 
electoral security. 
I test the hypothesis 
H a : (3 i 0	 (2) 
that is, that in aggregate, legislator gender characteristics have an effect on 
policy choice even when they conflict with constituents' preferences, against the 
null hypothesis 
H o : (3 = 0	 (3) 
that is, that gender-based legislator preferences are outweighed by political con­
cerns, and that constituents choose to elect legislators with specific revealed 
preferences, whether those preferences are formed by gender or some other fac­
tor. 
Data 
Data are taken from U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call votes as doc­
umented in the 1971-1992 Congressional Quarterly almanacs; see Table 4 for a 
listing of the specific votes used. These votes were determined to be pro- or anti­
free trade based on whether they had an obvious positive or negative effect on 
net barriers to trade. Votes with a large foreign policy element, as opposed to 
being strictly about trade protection, were excluded; for example, strategic ex­
port controls and political sanctions were not included in the sample. I conflate 
all yes and no positions; Le. if the representative took a yes position but did not 
actually vote, I count it as a yes vote. I then generate a FREETRADEVOTE 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the representative took the free trade posi­
tion and 0 if he or she took the anti-trade position. I generate a GOP variable 
taking the value of 1 if the representative is a Republican and 0 if he or she is 
a Democrat. Independents were dropped. 
The resulting data were merged with E. Scott Adler's congressional district 
data files for the appropriate congress to gain the district preference variables 
BLUCLLR (number of SIC "blue collar" workers in district), AGE65 (number 
of persons age 65+ in district), COAST (district adjacent to ocean or Great 
Lake), MDNINCM (median family income in district, in thousands of 1982-84 
dollars!, and URBAN (population in urban areas). The demographic variables 
lObservations with MDNINCM < 1 were dropped due to apparent data error. 
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AGE65, BLUCLLR, and URBAN were divided by population to produce per 
capita variables PCT6.5, PCTEC, and PCTURE. These, along with the inter­
action variable PCT65 x PCTBC were selected as controls because Mayda and 
Rodrik find strong effects on preference for income, age, and urban location, and 
because Blonigen (2009) finds life-cycle interaction effects between retirement 
and trade exposure, as well as effects for sectoral trade exposure (proxied here 
by BLUCLLR). COAST was used to control for the dependence of a district's 
economy on trade flows. I generate a years of incumbency variable, YRSIN C, 
and use it to proxy for electoral security. The congressional district index vari­
able used for those fixed effects takes a different value for each congressional 
district and, for a given district, takes a new value every time redistricting oc­
curs, either by census, or by mid-decade redistricting documented in the Adler 
data. 
Based on this literature, the expected signs of the regression coefficients are 
as follows: 
Variable Expected Sign 
GOP 
FEMREP 
PCT65 
PCTBC 
PCT65 x PCTBC + 
PCTURB + 
COAST + 
MDNINCM + 
YRSINC 
YRSINC x PCT65 + 
YRSINC x PCTBC + 
YRSINC x PCT65 x PCTBC 
YRSINC x PCTURB 
YRSINC x MDNINCM 
YRSINC x COAST 
YRSINC x FEMREP 
The summary statistics table offers some insights about these data. As an aside, 
note that female legislators provide less than 5% of the sample votes. Table 5 
shows that in my sample of 117 roll-call votes, the margin of victory is within 
5% of house membership, or roughly 21 votes, in only 10 cases. Therefore, it 
is unlikely that a small effect on the voting propensity of a small group causes 
any significant difference in trade policy outcomes in this sample. However, I 
am investigating revealed preferences, not policy outcomes. 
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4 Results 
Although theoretically, the linear probability model has a number of short­
comings, I use it here since I am only concerned with revealed differences in pref­
erences and not with making predictions, and because for these data, maximum­
likelihood techniques had their own problems: 
Results of the linear probability model under specifications (1) using bill 
fixed effects with Y RBIN C but without its interactions with constituent (de­
mographic) variables, (2) using bill fixed effects with YRBINC and its interac­
tions with gender and demographics, (3) using congressional district fixed effects 
with Y RBINC but without its interactions, and (4) using congressional district 
fixed effects with Y RBINC and its interactions are presented in Table 2. 
Examining the signs of the coefficients of the control regressors in the bill 
fixed effects specification yields mixed results as to their consistency with my 
expectations. First, the literature predicts negative signs on the coefficients of 
PCT65 and PCTEC and positive sign on their interaction; however, I find the 
opposite to be true. Being a Republican rather than a Democrat significantly in­
creases the probability of voting for freer trade. Urban and coastal location seem 
to only cause incumbency to have a more protectionist effect rather than cause 
any effect independently. As hypothesized, constituent income has a strong 
pro-trade effect; incumbency does not diminish this. Incumbency itself has a 
strong anti-trade effect in specification (1) but specification (2) shows that this 
is only the case in districts that are urban, coastal, or both relatively aged and 
relatively blue-collar; otherwise, incumbency strongly increases the probability 
of voting for free trade. 
In the congressional district fixed effects specifications (3) and (4), uninter­
acted demographic variables are omitted due to perfect collinearity with the 
fixed effect. These specifications produce qualitiatively similar results with re­
gard to political party and incumbency variables as (1) and (2); however, coef­
ficients on incumbency's interaction terms are in no case significant at even the 
10% level. 
Turning now to the variable of interest, regardless of which specification is 
used, the models with bill fixed effects yield a gender effect significant at the 
1% level with sign consistent with my hypothesis. In each specification the 
magnitude of the gender effect is between 3.0% and 4.1%. This is much smaller 
than the magnitude of the effect in Mayda and Rodrik at 7.4%, in Burgoon and 
Hiscox at 9.2%, and in O'Rourke and Sinnott of 8.2%. However, when using 
congressional district fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the 
gender effect is not significant at the 10% level. It is likely that either this 
difference is caused either by the very limited within-district variation of gender 
due to the small percentage of observations with FEMREP = 1, or by omitted 
variables bias from the unobserved district-level heterogeneity in the bill fixed 
effects model. 
Maximum-likelihood estimation technigues were also considered, but ulti­
mately rejected in favor of the linear probability approach: 
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•	 For the bill fixed effects model, conditional fixed effects logit models did 
not converge in Stata. 
•	 For the congressional district fixed effects model, maximum likelihood 
estimates of gender's effect are based on the very few instances where 
legislator gender changes within the lifetime of a congressional district. 
Thus despite the theoretical shortcomings of the linear probability model, I use 
it here and check its results for robustness to the use of maximum-likelihood 
techniques. 
For bill fixed effects models, unconditional fixed effects logit specifications 
are presented in Table 3 as a robustness check. However, one can see that except 
for increased significance of the incumbency interaction terms, the logit model 
produces results that are qualitatively the same as those produced by the linear 
probability model. 
For congressional district fixed effects models, conditional fixed effects logit 
specifications are presented in Table 4 as a robustness check. Again, the logit 
model produces results that are qualitatively the same as those produced by the 
linear probability model. 
Since these results indicate that the significance of gender in the bill fixed 
effects specifications may be due to omitted variables bias, I test my hypothesis 
with the congressional district fixed effects specifications instead. I therefore 
fail to reject H o : f3 = 0 and conclude that legislator gender characteristics may 
not persist even in the face of electoral pressure due to conflicting constituent 
interest. Instead, some unobserved heterogeneity between districts may simul­
tanously increase the probability of that district electing a female representative 
and increase the amount of trade protection which that district prefers. Since 
female membership in Congress has expanded a great deal since 1992 (Women 
in Congress, 1917-2006), future research might extend the sample to a more 
recent time period in order to determine whether is the case, or whether the in­
consistency between models is being driven by the fact that, for many districts, 
there is no within-district variation in legislator gender. 
Conclusion 
In a representative democracy, the task of a legislator is to represent his or 
her constituents' interests in the legislative body to which he or she belongs. 
However, in practice this is not always the case, as Coates and Munger find; 
legislators do in fact shirk. While their analysis is narrow in its sample and 
includes several legislator characteristic regressors, mine has a large sample and 
a single characteristic variable with an influence on policy preference supported 
by a rich literature. I find limited evidence that gender characteristics cause 
legislators to vote with a different degree of protectionism than the constituent, 
party, institutional, and electoral security constraints to which they are subject 
would suggest, but the results of a different specification calls the unbiasedness 
ofthese results into question. Thus I conclude that the most likely explanation is 
7 
that some unobserved district-level heterogeneity positively influences both the 
amount of t.r8de protection 3. district prefers 8nd the likelihood of that district 
electing a female representative. However, expansion of the data to increase the 
sample variance of gender would be necessary to conclusively determine whether 
this explanation is correct or this "shirking" phenomenon really exists. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES N Mean S.D. Min Max 
FREETRADEVOTE 48,936 0.454 0.498 0 1 
GOP 48,936 0.396 0.489 0 1 
FEMREP 48,936 0.0483 0.214 0 1 
PCT65 48,936 0.146 0.0573 0.00824 0.438 
PCTBC 48,936 0.102 0.0379 0.0279 0.263 
PCT65 x PCTBC 48,936 0.0138 0.00491 0.00131 0.0330 
PCTURB 48,936 0.732 0.228 0.165 1.000 
COAST 48,936 0.320 0.466 0 1 
MDNINCM 48,900 24.32 5.158 7.368 44.08 
YRSINC 48,936 6.243 5.066 0 21 
YRSINC x PCT65 48,936 1.009 1.025 0 9.199 
YRSINC x PCTBC 48,936 0.585 0.481 0 2.892 
YRSINC x PCT65 x PCTBC 48,936 0.0894 0.0880 0 0.686 
YRSINC x PCTURB 48,936 4.597 4.205 0 21.00 
YRSINC x MDNINCM 48,900 109.3 108.9 0 694.7 
YRSINC x COAST 48,936 1.949 4.027 0 21 
YRSINC x FEMREP 48,936 0.249 1.469 0 21 
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Table 2: Linear Probability Model 
VARlABLES 
GOP 
FEMREP 
PCT65 
PCTEC 
PCT65 x PCTEC 
PCTURE 
COAST 
MDNINCM 
YRSINC 
YRSINC x PCT65 
YRSINC x PCTBC 
YRSINC x PCT65 x PCTEC 
YRSINC x PCTURE 
YRSINC x MDNINCM 
YRSINC x COAST 
YRSINC x FEMREP 
Constant 
Bill fixed effects? 
District fixed effects? 
Observations 
F-statistic 
R2 
(1) 
0.286*** 
(0.00410) 
-0.0304*** 
(0.00868) 
1.113*** 
(0.0981) 
0.981*** 
(0.164) 
-12.83*** 
(1.141) 
-0.00809 
(0.0103) 
-0.00868** 
(0.00414) 
0.00256*** 
(0.000466) 
-0.00119*** 
(0.000432) 
0.210*** 
(0.0205) 
Yes 
No 
48,900 
731.9 
0.119 
(2) (3) (4) 
0.286*** 0.245*** 0.243*** 
(0.00410) (0.00905) (0.00912) 
-0.0408*** 0.000438 -0.0114 
(0.0134) (0.0173) (0.0202) 
1.147*** 
(0.160) 
0.909*** 
(0.240) 
-8.985*** 
(1. 773) 
0.0224 
(0.0161) 
0.00119 
(0.00651) 
0.00308*** 
(0.000618) 
0.0139*** 0.00161** 0.0145* 
(0.00435) (0.000741) (0.00767) 
-0.00406 -0.0193 
(0.0198) (0.0358) 
0.00647 -0.0161 
(0.0367) (0.0603) 
-0.573** -0.426 
(0.230) (0.405) 
-0.00492*** -0.00159 
(0.00182) (0.00323) 
-0.000138 -0.0000406 
(.0000898) (0.000166) 
-0.00177** -0.00176 
(0.000820) (0.00149) 
0.00175 0.00264 
(0.00196) (0.00329) 
0.120*** 0.0114 0.0399** 
(0.0311) (0.0164) (0.0165) 
Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes 
48,900 48,936 48,900 
416.1 261.7 236.1 
0.120 0.264 0.264 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l 
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Table 3: Unconditional Logit Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
GOP 0.383*** 0.383*** 
(0.00565) (0.00579) 
F EMREP -0.0549*** 
-0.0574*** 
(0.0189) (0.0189) 
PCT65 1.619*** 1.585*** 
(0.146) (0.237) 
PCTBC 1.433*** 1.232*** 
(0.249) (0.357) 
PCT65 x PCTBC -18.91*** 
-11.93*** 
(1. 723) (2.648) 
PCTURB -0.0124 0.0354 
(0.0158) (0.0239) 
COAST -0.0132** 0.00174 
(0.00618) (0.00961) 
MDNINCM 0.00376*** 0.00474*** 
(0.000707) (0.000932) 
Y RSINC -0.00172*** 0.0221*** 
(0.000656) (0.00647) 
YRSINC x PCT65 0.0117 
(0.0296) 
YRSINC x PCTBC 0.0346 
(0.0558) 
YRSINC x PCT65 x PCTBC 
-1.163*** 
(0.358) 
YRSINC x PCTURB 
-0.00847*** 
(0.00281) 
YRSINC x MDNINCM 
-0.000277** 
(0.000136) 
YRSINC x COAST 
-0.00277** 
(0.00124) 
YRSINC x FEMREP 0.00253 
(0.00300) 
Bill dummies? Yes Yes 
Observations 47,323 47,323 
X2 statistic 17548 17622 
Pseudo R2 0.270 0.271 
Listed are marginal effects, not coefficient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l 
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Table 4: Conditional Logit Model 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
GOP 1.488*** 1.468*** 
(0.0595) . (0.0599) 
FEMREP 0.0152 -0.0741 
(0.116) (0.134) 
YRSINC x PCT65 -0.246 
(0.271) 
YRSINC x PCTBC -0.247 
(0.465) 
YRSINC x PCT65 x PCTBC -1.256 
(3.062) 
YRSINC x PCTURB -0.0138 
(0.0228) 
YRSINC x MDNINCM -0.000547 
(0.00124) 
YRSINC x COAST -0.0145 
(0.0103) 
YRSINC x FEMREP 0.0194 
(0.0225) 
YRSINC 0.0125** 0.115** 
(0.00512) (0.0586) 
District fixed effects? Yes Yes 
Bill dummies? Yes Yes 
Observations 48,617 48,581 
X2 statistic 14669 14660 
Pseudo R2 0.282 0.282 
Listed are coefficient estimates; Stata did not compute any marginal effects.
 
Standard errors in parentheses.
 
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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Table 5: House Trade Votes 
"Free trade" , Name in Table CQ Vote Bill No. Year Passage Yea Nay 
position 
N Budget Resolution/ Oil Import Fee 42 H Con 1989 N 49 173 
Res 106 
N Unfair Trade Practices of Japan/ Adoption 42 H Con 1985 Y 394 19 
Under Suspension of the Rules Res 107 
N Statement of Disapproval of Any FTA 376 H Con 1992 Y 362 0 
Jeopardizing US Law Res 246 
N Sense of Congress That Japan Should Cor­ 561 H Con 1980 Y 363 2 
rect Trade Imbalance/ Adoption Under Res 376 
Suspension of the Rules 
N Fiscal 1988 Continuing Appropriations/ 456 H J Res 1987 Y 399 17 
Prohibit Japanese Firms From Working on 395 
Public-Works Projects 
Y Disapprove Oil Import Fee/ Passage 263 H J Res 1980 Y 376 30 
531 
N Fiscal 1987 Continuing Appropriations/ 439 H J Res 1986 Y 264 133 
Require 50 Percent Of Labor and Materi­ 738 
als In Offshore Drilling Rigs Be American 
In Origin 
Y Fiscal 1987 Continuing Appropriations/ 438 H J Res 1986 Y 297 113 
Imported Wine, Beer, and Spirits Stan­ 738 
dards 
N Disapproval of Fast-Track Procedures/ 115 H Res 1991 N 21 140 
Adoption 101 
N Fast-Track Resolutions/ Rule 114 H Res 1991 Y 274 148 
101, H 
Res 146 
N Remedy for Violation by Japan of 74 H Res 1989 Y 416 0 
US/Japan Semiconductor Agreement / 146 
Adoption Under Suspension of the Rules 
Y Grant Fast-Track Procedures/ Adoption 116 H Res 1991 Y 329 85 
146 
Y Foreign Trade Reform/ Rule 472 HR 10710 1973 Y 230 147 
Y Foreign Trade Reform/ Passage 475 HR 10710 1973 Y 272 140 
Y Foreign Trade Reform/ Adoption 532 HR 10710 1974 Y 323 36 
N Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Rule 318 HR 1154 1987 Y 305 111 
N Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Passage 319 HR 1154 1987 Y 263 156 
N Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Passage 341 HR 1154 1988 Y 248 150 
N Textile and Apparel Trade Act/ Veto Over­ 426 HR 1154 1988 N 272 152 
ride 
N Meat Import Act/ Passage 802 HR 11545 1978 Y 289 66 
Y Meat Import Act/ Raise Minimum Import 786 HR 11545 1978 N 131 139 
Quota 
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Table 5: House Trade Votes 
"Free trade'" Name in Table CQ Vote Bill No. Year Passage Yea Nay 
position 
Y Suspend Duty on Bicycle Parts/ Passage 312 HR 12254 1976 Y 370 41 
Under Suspension of the Rules 
N Auto Domestic Content Requirement / 416 HR 1234 1983 Y 214 196 
Place Conditions on Sunset Provision 
N Auto Domestic Content Requirement/ 417 HR 1234 1983 Y 219 199 
Passage 
Y Auto Domestic Content Requirement/ 415 HR 1234 1983 N 178 232 
Prohibit Requirements If They Violate 
GATT 
Y Treasury, Postal Service Appropriations/ 643 HR 12930 1978 N 194 201 
Prohibit President From Imposing Fees or 
Quotas on Oil Imports 
N Fiscal 1979 Defense Appropriations/ Pro­ 579 HR 13635 1978 N 72 302 
hibit Purchase of Foreign Trucks to Haul 
Cargo in Combat Areas 
N Sugar Stabilization Act/ Passage 785 HR 13750 1978 Y 186 159 
N Sugar Stabilization Act/ Adoption 831 HR 13750 1978 N 177 194 
N Sugar Act Extension/ Rule 183 HR 14747 1974 Y 370 13 
N Sugar Act Extension/ Passage 187 HR 14747 1974 N 175 209 
Y Sugar Act Extension/ Phase Out South 184 HR 14747 1974 N 149 238 
Africa Quota 
N Port-Cargo Diversion Rate Filing/ Passage 350 HR 1511 1984 N 188 209 
Under Suspension of the Rules 
N Textile Import Quotas/ Rule 319 HR 1562 1985 Y 277 139 
N Textile Import Quotas/ Passage 320 HR 1562 1985 Y 262 159 
N Textile Import Quotas/ Concur in Senate 385 HR 1562 1985 Y 298 109 
Amendments 
N Textile Import Quotas/ Passage 386 HR 1562 1985 Y 255 161 
N Textile Import Quotas/ Veto Override 265 HR 1562 1986 N 276 149 
N Fiscal 1988 Defense Authorization/ Amer­ 114 HR 1748 1987 Y 229 187 
ican Work on SDI 
Y Suspend President's Oil Import Fees Au­ 5 HR 1767 1975 Y 309 114 
thority/ Passage 
Y Fiscal 1988-89 State Department Autho­ 196 HR 1777 1987 Y 334 70 
rization/ Voice of America Contracting 
Y Fiscal 1988-89 State Department Autho­ 197 HR 1777 1987 N 167 237 
rization/ Voice of America Contracting 
N Penalties for Foreign Shipbuilding Subsi­ 119 HR 2056 1992 Y 290 125 
dies/ Rule 
N Penalties for Foreign Shipbuilding Subsi­ 121 HR 2056 1992 Y 339 78 
dies/ Passage 
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Table 5: House Trade Votes 
"Free trade'" Name in Table CQ Vote Bill No. Year Passage Yea Nay 
position 
y Penalties for Foreign Shipbuilding Subsi­ 120 HR 2056 1992 N 179 237 
dies/ Motion to Recommit 
N International Sugar Agreement/ Rule 482 HR 2172 1979 Y 216 12 
Y Aircraft Materials Tariff Exemption Under 245 HR 2177 1976 Y 359 4 
Reimportation/ Passage Under Suspension 
of the Rules 
Y United States/ Israel FTA/ Passage Under 89 HR 2268 1985 Y 422 0 
Suspension of the Rules 
y Extend Duty Suspension on Feathers and 50 HR 2492 1980 Y 371 0 
Down/ Passage 
y Meat Import Act/ Raise Minimum Level 585 HR 2727 1979 N 136 266 
of Import Quota 
y Caribbean Basin Initiative/ Rule 236 HR 2769 1983 Y 212 204 
Y Caribbean Basin Initiative/ Passage 237 HR 2769 1983 Y 289 129 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Rule 67 HR3 1987 Y 326 83 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Negotiating Objec­ 69 HR3 1987 Y 398 19 
tives 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Cuban Imports 70 HR3 1987 Y 394 27 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Excess Trade Surplus 72 HR3 1987 Y 218 214 
Countries 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Final Passage 78 HR3 1987 Y 290 137 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Rule 63 HR3 1988 Y 340 61 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Adoption 66 HR3 1988 Y 312 107 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Veto Override 150 HR3 1988 Y 308 113 
Y Omnibus Trade Bill/ Comprehensive Sub­ 77 HR3 1987 N 156 268 
stitute . 
y Omnibus Trade Bill/ Recede from 426 HR3 1987 N 175 239 
Gephardt Amendment 
N Steel Quota Enforcement/ Passage Under 258 HR 3275 1989 Y 354 10 
Suspension of the Rules 
N Tariff and Trade Act/ Adoption of Confer­ 399 HR 3398 1984 Y 386 1 
ence Report 
N Prohibit Foreign Construction of Naval 275 HR 3464 1981 Y 366 21 
Vessels/ Passage Under Suspension of the 
Rules 
N Food and Agriculture Act of 1981/ Require 261 HR 3603 1981 Y 223 162 
Imported Meat To Be Produced Without 
Drugs or Chemicals Banned In US 
N Food and Agriculture Act of 1981/ Require 262 HR 3603 1981 Y 211 168 
Imported Meat To Be Produced Without 
Drugs or Chemicals Banned In US 
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Table 5: House Trade Votes 
"Free trade'" Name in Table CQ Vote Bill No. Year Passage Yea Nay 
position 
Y Drug Price Competition/ Extend Time for 336 HR 3605 1984 N 36 323 
Catalogs to Comply With New Foreign/ 
Domestic Labeling Requirements 
Y Wine Equity and Export Expansion/ Mo­ 387 HR 3795 1984 N 178 239 
tion to Recommit and Remove Import Pro­
tection 
Y Needles and Pins and Taxes/ Adoption 533 HR421 1974 Y 257 71 
N Fiscal 1989 Defense Authorization/ Pro­ 95 HR 4264 1988 Y 365 50 
hibit Awarding Contracts to Discrimina­
tory Foreign Contractors 
Y Miscellaneous Tariff/ Motion to Recommit 356 HR 4318 1992 N 125 263 
N Textile Trade Act/Rule 334 HR 4328 1990 Y 293 121 
N Textile Trade Act / Concur in Senate 335 HR 4328 1990 Y 271 149 
Amendments 
N Textile Trade Act/ Veto Override 440 HR 4328 1990 N 275 152 
N Fiscal 1987 Defense Authorization/ Prefer­ 259 HR 4428 1986 Y 241 163 
ence for Domestic Goods 
Y Trade Agreements Act/Passage 286 HR 4537 1979 Y 395 7 
N Trade Remedies Reform Act/ Passage 294 HR 4784 1984 Y 259 95 
Y Trade Remedies Reform Act/ Recommit 293 HR 4784 1984 N 128 231 
and Modify 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Japanese Trading 123 HR 4800 1986 Y 408 5 
Practices 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Passage 128 HR 4800 1986 Y 295 115 
Y Omnibus Trade Bill/ Strike Unfair Trading 120 HR 4800 1986 N 137 276 
Practices Provisions 
Y Omnibus Trade Bill/ Strike Antidump­ 122 HR 4800 1986 N 79 338 
ing Enforcement and Countervailing Du­
ties Provisions 
N Omnibus Trade Bill/ Passage 231 HR 4848 1988 Y 376 45 
Y Omnibus Trade Bill/ Motion to Recommit 230 HR 4848 1988 N 183 237 
and Report Without Ethanol Import Duty 
Exemption 
Y US-Canada Trade Agreement Implementa­ 267 HR 5090 1988 Y 366 40 
tion/ Passage 
N Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/Order 270 HR 5100 1992 Y 247 167 
Previous Question 
N Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/Rule 271 HR 5100 1992 Y 252 163 
N Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/Auto 272 HR 5100 1992 Y 260 166 
Trade With Japan 
N Reauthorize Super 301 Authority/Passage 273 HR 5100 1992 Y 280 145 
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Table 5: House Trade Votes 
"Free trade'" Narne in Table CQ Vote Bill No. Year Pa..<;sage Yea NIlY 
position 
N Automobile Domestic Content Require-- 407 HR 5133 1982 Y 191 120 
ments/ Rule 
N Automobile Domestic Content Require-- 409 HR 5133 1982 N 11 331 
ments/ Permit Adjustment 
N Automobile Domestic Content Require-- 433 HR 5133 1982 N 88 310 
ments/ Eliminate Penalties If Japan's 
Trade Surplus Falls 
Automobile Domestic Content Require- 435 HR 5133 1982 Y 215 188 
ments/ Passage 
N 
Y Automobile Domestic Content Require-- 432 HR 5133 1982 N 92 301 
ments/ Rename as Smoot-Hawley Trade 
Barriers Act of 1982 
Y Automobile Domestic Content Require-- 434 HR 5133 1982 Y 195 194 
ments/ Stipulate That Bill Does Not 
Supersede Requirements of International 
Agreements 
Y Department of Defense Authorization/ Al- 172 HR 5167 1984 Y 237 159 
low Dp To Two Non-DS-Built Cruise Ships 
in Trade Between DS Ports 
N Fiscal 1987 Transportation Appropria- 244 HR 5205 1986 N 133 281 
tions/ Ban Purchases of Non-Domestic 
Goods and Services 
Y
N 
US-Israel FTA Authorization/ Passage 385 HR 5377 1984 
Generalized System of Preferences Re-- 388 HR 6023 1984 
Y
N 
416 6 
174 233 
newal Act/ Remove Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea From Duty-Free Eligibility 
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y 
International Sugar Agreement/ Passage 116 HR 6029 1980 
Suspend Zinc Duty/ Veto Override 478 HR 6191 1974 
Steel Import Stabilization/ Passage 386 HR 6301 1984 
Y
N
Y 
367 30 
249 150 
285 134 
Energy Taxes/ Passage 235 HR 6860 1975 Y 291 130 
Energy Taxes/ Delete Oil Quota Language 204 HR 6860 1975 
Energy Taxes/ Raise Import Quotas 205 HR 6860 1975 
Energy Taxes/ Raise Import Quotas To 206 HR 6860 1975 
N
Y
N 
185 224 
211 200 
195 213 
Offset Decline in Natural Gas Supplies 
Y Energy Conservation and Oil Policy Act/ 391 HR7014 1975 N 146 254 
Delete Language Authorizing the Pres­
ident To Act As Exclusive Purchasing 
Agent of Imported Oil 
Y Disapprove Oil Import Fee, Extend Debt 273 HR 7428 1980 Y 335 34 
Limit/ Veto Override 
Y Customs Procedures Reform/ Passage Un­ 609 HR 8149 1977 
der Suspension of the Rules 
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Table 5: House Trade Votes 
"Free trade" , Name in Table CQ Vote Bill No. Year Passage Yea Nay 
position 
Y Customs Procedures Reform/ Adoption 709 HR 8149 1978 Y 360 1 
Y Continue Shoe Copying Lathe Duty Sus- 209 HR 8215 1973 Y 403 0 
pension/ Committee Amendments 
N International Coffee Act Extension/ Pas- 244 HR 8293 1971 Y 201 100 
sage 
N Sugar Act Extension/ Do Not Allow 79 HR 8866 1971 Y 213 166 
Amendment Deleting South Africa Quota 
N Sugar Act Extension/ Passage 80 HR 8866 1971 Y 229 128 
N Sugar Act Extension/ Adoption 192 HR 8866 1971 Y 195 91 
N Carson City Silver Dollars/ Prohibit Re- 833 HR 9937 1978 Y 198 29 
duction or Elimination of Duties or Import
 
Restrictions on Certain Textiles/Adoption
 
t 
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